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One of the common denominators of childhood 
and youth, at least in more economically developed 
countries, is schooling. Therefore, if we want to 
analyze the contemporary conditions of childhood 
and youth, we will have to include the conditions 
that schools and other educational settings in more 
economically developed countries create for children 
and youth. In this short essay I want to outline briefly 
a set of perspectives that allow us to understand the 
different demands that schools make of children 
and youth as well as the responsibilities schools 
have toward them. My focus is on reconceptualizing 
children and youth based on ideas of decentred 
subjectivity and of reception and response.
Decentring Autonomous Rationality, Decentring 
Adulthood
Traditionally, schooling has viewed children and 
youth primarily as not-yet adults. The focus has been 
on helping children and youth become adults in the 
sense that schooling allows young people to leave the 
dependence that characterizes childhood and youth 
behind and become independent and rational adults. 
Ylva Bergström, for example, has analyzed how the 
universal right to education, included in the 1948 
Declaration of Human Rights and reiterated in a variety 
of forms in other Conventions, is based on ideas of the 
child as not yet rational and autonomous and in need 
of help in becoming so: the right to education is not 
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really a right of the child but rather, to borrow from 
Thomas Marshall, a “right of the adult citizen to have 
been educated” (qtd. in Bergström 173).
Throughout the twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first, the ideal of the rational, autonomous 
subject has been heavily critiqued. As I explain in 
my essay “The Empty Chair,” these critiques have 
revolved around the idea that the subject is not nearly 
as rational and autonomous as it has been held to 
be. Critics have charged that the subject’s apparent 
physical and mental autonomy and self-awareness are 
predicated on a fundamental dependence on who and 
what lies outside of it—on the Other, whether in the 
form of the personal Other, the Unconscious, Death, 
or some other Other. As a result of these critiques, the 
subject has been moved from its central position to a 
decentred one.
The idea of decentred subjectivity opens up new 
ways of seeing children and youth. If human beings are 
by definition dependent rather than independent, and 
remain always susceptible to interruption by the Other 
(such as in the form of one’s own illness and death, 
the death of loved ones, or one’s Unconscious), then 
dependence is no longer the distinctive characteristic 
of children and youth, but a characteristic of human 
beings at all ages and stages of life. As Judith Butler 
remarks in dialogue with Sunaura Taylor, “there’s an 
idea of self-sufficiency that might be a fantasy and 
kind of an ideal norm that doesn’t actually suit any 
of us” (187). Consequently, if autonomous, rational 
adulthood is a fiction, and if our responsibility to 
children and youth is not to turn them as expediently 
as possible into autonomous, rational adults, this 
raises the question of how we might conceive of our 
responsibility to children and youth differently.
Hospitality and Subjectification
In my work I have proposed that our responsibility 
to children and youth is to receive them into the world 
and to accept that they will change the world into 
which they are received. In developing this perspective 
I have made use of the work of several philosophers, 
including philosophers of education. In particular, I 
have argued for education to be guided by an “ethic 
of hospitality” as elaborated by Jacques Derrida and 
inspired by the work of Emmanuel Levinas. An ethic 
of hospitality is an ethical framework focused on 
receiving the Other, in which hospitality is understood 
as “an unconditional gift given by a host who is aware 
of her or his indebtedness to the guest. Immediately, 
this marks a departure from other conceptions of 
hospitality based on reciprocity or exchange [that is to 
say, conditionality], in which the guest incurs a debt by 
accepting hospitality” (Ruitenberg, “The Empty Chair”). 
In other words, from the perspective of Derrida’s work, 
hospitality is all about giving space to the guest and not 
about the host controlling that space—but without the 
host fully surrendering the space to the guest, because 
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then he or she would no longer be host, hence no longer in a position 
to offer hospitality (Ruitenberg, “Giving Place”). Thus conceived, 
hospitality is about operating in the tension between giving space to 
the Other and knowing that any space one offers imposes constraints. 
I should note that “space” here can be taken in the literal sense of a 
territory or built structure, but can also mean a body of knowledge, a 
discourse, a social identity, or some other figurative “space.”
Educational scholar Gert Biesta has argued that education should 
have an “interest in subjectification,” by which he means that education 
should give space to students’ becoming subjects (“On the Weakness” 
360)—or, perhaps more precisely as it is inevitable that students 
become subjects in some form or another, that schools should pay 
attention to the kinds of spaces they offer and how these allow for or 
proscribe particular kinds of subjectivities. I agree with this perspective 
and would like to emphasize that subjectification is becoming subject 
in the double sense of being subjected to and emerging as a subject 
with agency (see, for example, Butler’s The Psychic Life of Power). 
Biesta distinguishes subjectification from socialization (“the ways 
in which, through education, individuals become part of existing 
sociocultural, political, and moral orders”) and qualification (“the ways 
in which education contributes to the acquisition of knowledge, skills, 
and dispositions that qualify us for doing something”), both of which 
are also undeniably purposes of schooling (“On the Weakness” 355). As 
Loren Lerner’s essay in this Forum illustrates, children have historically 
been so deeply invested with adults’ “beliefs, desires, fantasies, and 
expectations” (102), both of the kinds of adults they should become 
(such as “good wives and mothers”) and of the world more generally, 
that the focus in child-rearing and schooling has been on socialization, 
with little attention given to subjectification.
. . . hospitality is 
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To work from an ethic of hospitality means that 
one operates from the understanding that one must 
receive the Other into a (metaphorical) home, which 
means both that there must be a home for the Other 
to be received into and that this Other’s entrance 
may change that home. The ethic of hospitality is 
not about my “right” as host to hold onto the home 
as it is, but rather about my duty to help the Other 
grapple with the critical inheritance of that home. 
Here subjectification in the double sense I have 
discussed becomes visible: the guest is subjected to 
the constraints of the home as it is but, at the same 
time, when the guest takes her place, her subjectivity 
exceeds the constraints of the home into which she has 
been received, and she can change it.
Seeing Children and Youth as Respondents
With the subjectification function of education 
in mind, I agree with Biesta that “it matters how we 
call those we teach,” that is to say, that it matters how 
we characterize the subjectivity for which education 
creates space (“Learner”). (Biesta’s phrase “how we 
call those we teach” encompasses both what we call 
those we teach and how we interpellate them.) In 
the article in which Biesta makes this argument, he 
proposes that we should call those whom we teach 
“speakers.” This argument is based on the work of 
Jacques Rancière, who argues that we should work 
from the presupposition of equal intelligence rather 
than working toward equality as a distant goal (see, for 
example, The Ignorant Schoolmaster). I do not disagree 
with Biesta’s argument but would like to emphasize 
that all speech is secondary: it responds to an address. 
Biesta’s title, in fact, highlights that very clearly: it 
matters that those we teach are addressed as speakers, 
that is to say, that they have an opportunity to speak 
in response to an address. Following the ideas I have 
outlined briefly here, then, I would characterize the 
subjectivity for which education creates space as that 
of a respondent. 
In an ethic of hospitality, the guest must not only 
be addressed by the host, but must also have an 
opportunity to respond to this address, not in the sense 
of reciprocating the gift of hospitality but in the sense 
of being able to enter into the world offered by the host 
and being able to make a place in this world. Another 
philosopher who has argued that “newcomers” to the 
world should be able to make a place for themselves 
and change the world through the introduction 
of their unique newness is Hannah Arendt, who 
argues that children should have “the chance of 
undertaking something new, something unforeseen 
by us” (196). This introduction of newness depends 
on others, however, just as others depend on us for 
the introduction of their newness: as Biesta suggests, 
“our coming into the world structurally relies on the 
activities of others to take up our beginnings” (Beyond 
Learning 92). What this means is that I only “come into 
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the world” if others respond in some way to what I 
say and write and do; if my words and actions are not 
even seen or heard by others, I cannot be said to have 
“come into the world.” The introduction of newness 
is always a response and in turn provokes response. 
To put it another way, in the words of an ethic of 
hospitality, I can only respond because I have been 
received into a world, and others can only respond if 
I welcome them in turn—even though the world into 
which I welcome them will be different from the one 
into which I was received.
This is how I conceive what Biesta describes as 
education’s interest in subjectification, and it poses 
challenging questions for educators. To what extent 
are schools spaces in which young people have a 
chance to respond, to enter into the world and make 
a space there? To what extent do we see children and 
youth as subjects who have the right to be not merely 
socialized—that is, adapted to the world—but received 
into the world and who have the ability to respond 
to it? The concept of response involves a critical 
engagement by the guest with the space into which he 
or she is received, and seeing children and youth as 
respondents requires that we see them as responsible 
for and capable of such critical engagement.
Of course, just as it is inevitable that young 
people become subjects—as I pointed out, the 
question is what kind of spaces education offers 
and how these allow for or proscribe particular 
kinds of subjectivities—it is inevitable that young 
people respond. The question is thus not exactly how 
education can ensure that young people become 
respondents, but rather how education can see young 
people’s responses as responses rather than as reactions 
or as a lack of response altogether. The concept of 
response is worth a closer look. The word “response” 
shares its root spon with words such as “spouse” and 
“sponsor”; the root comes from the Latin spondere, 
which means to engage, promise, or bind oneself. This 
sense of engagement with the world is central to the 
conception of response that underpins my argument for 
seeing young people as respondents.
Queer Respondents
Nat Hurley’s essay in this Forum illustrates one 
of the forms a critical inheritance may take: the 
deliberately perverse and insubordinate rewriting and 
resignification of children’s literature and its symbols. 
Sometimes such critical responses are offered by 
children, as is the case in the use of the mermaid 
figure by trans and gender-nonconforming children. 
More often, however, such as in the queer revisions of 
children’s stories, the critical response is belated: it is 
not offered until the child has become an adult. This 
belatedness may signal a lack of hospitality for queer 
youth, who either do not feel they can speak back to 
the (mis)representations of childhood they encounter or 
whose speaking back is not heard as response.
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Jen Gilbert has used the ethic of hospitality to think through 
the particular inhospitality faced by queer children and youth. 
She gives the example of Ludovic, the main character in the 
1997 film Ma vie en rose, who shows up in a dress at his parents’ 
housewarming party. Gilbert does not discuss it in these terms, 
but Ludovic’s sartorial choice can be seen as a cogent—some 
might say insubordinate—response to his dislike of “boys’ 
clothes” and his preference for dresses. In the film, Ludovic’s 
response is read as such only by his grandmother; his parents 
and neighbours read it as a strange and unwelcome form of 
acting out.
Gilbert is right to point out that the ethic of hospitality 
“demands that we accept what is not yet intelligible. . . . We are 
to welcome the stranger before we know who or what he or she 
is” (27). That includes the determination of an acceptable—or, 
for that matter, any stable and identifiable—gender and sexuality. 
When she asks rhetorically, “Is there anything more foreign in 
education than gayness?” (28), however, I would like to caution 
against reading hospitality as concerned only or primarily with 
marginalized social identities; it is concerned with the alterity or 
fundamental otherness of the Other, and alterity and difference 
are not the same. As Emmanuel Levinas explains in an interview 
with Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, and Alison Ainley, “Alterity is 
not at all the fact that there is a difference, that facing me there 
is someone who has a different nose than mine, different colour 
eyes, another character. It is not difference, but alterity. . . . It 
is the beginning of transcendence. You are not transcendent by 
virtue of a different trait” (170). In other words, the Other in 
Derrida’s and Levinas’s work is not other as a result of “othering” 
. . . hospitality . . . is 
concerned with the 
alterity or fundamental 
otherness of the 
Other . . . .
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or marginalization. Rather, each is fundamentally other 
to each or, as Derrida would have it, “tout autre est 
tout autre” (87).
Singular and Multiple Guests
One of the challenges of treating children and 
youth as respondents and of imagining the ethic of 
hospitality in schools is that the philosophical literature 
on hospitality works from the model of a singular 
host and a singular guest, and the typical situation of 
classrooms and schools is one of a multitude of guests. 
Both Derrida and Levinas emphasize the primacy of 
this relation of two even as they acknowledge that, in 
lived reality, we rarely find ourselves in situations of 
only two. As Levinas states, “What seems to me very 
important, is that there are not only two of us in the 
world. But I think that everything begins as if we were 
only two” (170). As soon as the host has to respond 
not to a singular but to multiple guests, one guest’s 
needs and demands are necessarily weighed against 
another’s. This does violence to the absolute alterity of 
each singular Other: “I am led to compare the faces, 
to compare the two people. Which is a terrible task. 
It is entirely different from speaking to the face. To 
compare them is to place them in the same genre” 
(174). The singularity of each person is violated as two 
sets of needs and demands, each incomparable with 
any other, must now be appraised and prioritized in 
relation to each other.
Derrida insists that the demand of unconditional 
hospitality is a pure, ethical demand of responding  
to a singular stranger who is absolutely Other, but,  
like Levinas, he understands that “there are not only 
two of us in the world” and that in most situations, 
actual decisions will be shaped by practical 
constraints. He argues, however, that such decisions 
should not be taken without some reference back  
to unconditional hospitality. As I have argued 
elsewhere, while mass schooling as social institution 
cannot be run based on the principle of unconditional 
hospitality, schooling that does not maintain a 
reference to this principle loses its reference to 
education and to ethical education in particular 
(“Giving Place” 270).
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